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trasting ways: for example, functional factors were seen as playing a big role in the institu-
tionalization of social pacts in Ireland, whereas the chapter on Italy places more emphasis on 
power-distributional considerations. Space does not allow for detailed consideration of the 
case-study chapters, but each was very competently put together.
A common criticism of edited volumes is that they are disjointed and lack focus. This 
book does not demonstrate this shortcoming. The editors have gone to great pains to pro-
duce a coherent and integrated assessment throughout the book. The result is a scholarly 
and rigorous analysis of social pacts within the terms set by the authors, making it a must-read 
for anyone interested in European social pacts or European industrial relations more widely.
Nonetheless, the book cannot be considered the definitive work on social pacts largely 
because the theoretical framework employed in the book is too narrow to capture all the dy-
namics created by these arrangements. For example, because the theoretical framework fo-
cuses almost exclusively on the processes that drive the formation and maintenance of social 
pacts, there is little discussion in the book about the relationship between social pacts and 
economic and social performance: in other words, there is too much focus on inputs and not 
enough on outputs. Other important considerations are omitted from the analysis. For in-
stance, even though the book is littered with references to the European monetary union, 
there is no systemic attempt to discuss the relationship between social pacts and the dynam-
ics of European integration. All in all, the book is a fine, scholarly work, but it does not pro-
vide a comprehensive assessment of the dynamics of social pacts in Europe.
Paul Teague
Professor
Management School, Queen’s University Belfast
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Kerstin Hamann and John Kelly analyze the emergence of social pacts across a wide range 
of western European countries and explore the role played by electoral competition in ex-
plaining such pacts. In doing so, they depart from previous research in two important ways. 
First, the book emphasizes the electoral incentives governments have when offering social 
partners a way to become involved in the regulation of a certain policy area. The second 
major innovation refers to the dependent variable. In contrast to previous literature on social 
pacts, the authors have used social pact offers rather than social pacts actually signed. They 
accordingly code government choice as a dichotomous variable with two alternatives: to offer 
social pacts or to legislate unilaterally. Even though the adoption of this dichotomous vari-
able seems to be the most adequate given the focus on electoral competition and voting be-
havior, it had been neglected in previous works that adopted government-based explanations.
One of the most important findings of the book is that government willingness to offer a 
pact to social partners is positively correlated with vote losses in the last elections. This would 
confirm the main hypothesis put forward by the authors according to which social pacts are 
to a large extent motivated by an electoral calculus. Moreover, the book also concludes that 
social pact offers are more likely to happen with center or left parties in power, coalition 
governments, and weak executives, hence confirming some of the insights by previous works. 
Other variables such as economic conditions, collective bargaining coordination, or welfare 
state regime are found irrelevant to explain social pact offers.
The book fills an important gap in a growing body of research that had relied mostly on 
industrial relations theories and more recently on welfare state reform analysis. These au-
thors provide fresh air to the literature on social pacts, which was in a stalemate as it had 
failed to provide convincing explanations for the rise and fall of pacts. Once neo-corporatist 
theories were definitively abandoned to explain practices in countries without the appropri-
ate institutional setting, there had been several attempts to explain the paradox of social 
pacts. Electoral politics had been almost absent in this debate and lacked a coherent and 
systematic treatment. The book provides a rigorous account of how governments build their 
preferences about social pacts and which variables may affect their decisions in this regard.
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To successfully achieve these goals, Hamann and Kelly combine multivariate analysis and 
qualitative case studies. While some recent books on social pacts had already relied on a 
mixed method, the authors manage to achieve an optimum balance between the quantita-
tive test of general propositions and the systematic analysis of deviations from the expected 
path through case studies. Moreover, the broad country coverage further enhances the valid-
ity of the theoretical arguments put forward.
The combination of a sound theoretical framework with mixed methods has successfully 
contributed to the effectiveness of the book in providing evidence lending support to the 
initial hypotheses. Even though the authors acknowledge the existence of some cases that 
deviate from the expected pattern, the results seem to overwhelmingly prove the authors’ 
theoretical insights about the political nature of social pacts. Moreover, the book opens the 
door to further research on this issue that would address some of the aspects in need of con-
sideration in future work. For example, one consideration is indeed related to the main inde-
pendent variable explaining social pacts, namely, electoral competition. As the authors 
rightly point out, government’s electoral incentives have been widely neglected in previous 
works. This would justify the adoption of an approach that pays more attention to such in-
centives. In their attempt to integrate this variable, however, the authors have almost com-
pletely disregarded other variables that have figured prominently in previous research. Even 
though they have controlled for them in the quantitative analysis and have made some refer-
ence in the qualitative case studies, there is very little evidence provided in this regard. The 
implicit assumption seems to be that the only actor that has the final say about the signature 
of a social pact is the government. As it is now, the argument misses completely the interac-
tionist approach that had dominated the previous literature. Even though it is true that gov-
ernment decisions take place in a context of weakening trade unions, the latter nonetheless 
retain some strategic capacity and power tools such as conflict. In particular, an important 
variable missing in the quantitative analysis that may affect government decisions to offer 
social pacts or to sign them is labor’s threat to call for a political strike or equivalent forms of 
conflict. Government decisions may vary according to the expected reaction of trade unions, 
and the mobilization capacity of trade unions is not necessarily related to their bargaining 
coordination.
In their account of the political logic of social pacts, the authors refer to legitimacy as the 
main variable to be considered to explain the incentives governments have to offer pacts to 
social partners. In other words, legitimacy is the only aspect governments would include into 
their calculation of whether or not to offer social pacts. However, there is another important 
aspect to be considered, namely, the efficacy of policies. In some cases, this efficacy crucially 
depends on social partners’ organizational capabilities. Government regulations may be inef-
fective if social partners take a different stand in collective bargaining. This would certainly 
be the case with wage restraint, but also with labor market reforms. Thus, to assume that le-
gitimacy is the only determinant of government strategies and that the legitimacy input is the 
same for all governments independent of the organizational capabilities of social partners is 
too strong an assumption. Even though the authors control for bargaining coordination in 
the quantitative test, this does not really capture the capacity social partners may have to dis-
rupt the implementation of a certain policy.
Regarding the dependent variable, the authors rightly chose social pact offers and not 
social pacts actually signed as their dependent variable. By doing this, however, they exclude 
some bipartite agreements in which governments may encourage the process and endorse 
the final outcome but are formally excluded from negotiations. These would be functional 
equivalents of tripartite social pacts that are nonetheless excluded from the analysis. At the 
same time, some social pact offers may be just window-dressing exercises without any real 
government determination to engage in a process of social dialogue. Including them into 
the database for quantitative analysis may introduce some noise into the results.
The above considerations have to be interpreted as recommendations for future work on 
this topic that build on the excellent job done by the authors. Their contribution to existing 
knowledge and theory building is certainly remarkable and will become a central piece for 
the study of the relationship between social partners and governments in the coming years.
Oscar Molina
Lecturer
Sociology Department, Autonomous University of Barcelona, Spain
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